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Problems and New Solutions
by H. Patrick Furman
On October 27, 1989, the
Chief Justice of the Col-
orado Supreme Court is-
sued two directives relating
to the appointment of counsel for indi-
gent persons who have a constitutional
or statutory right to counsel [published
in 19 The Colorado Lawyer 85 (Jan.
1990)]. These directives may change
substantially the way in which counsel
are appointed in these cases and may af-
fect all lawyers who practice in Colorado.
The need for court-appointed counsel
often arises in criminal cases where the
Office of Public Defender has a conflict of
interest. The Criminal Law Section of
the Colorado Bar Association ("CBA"),
along with other interepted parties, cur-
rently is trying to determine the best
way to implement these changes. This
article gives a brief history of the right to
counsel in criminal cases, outlines the
current situation and the changes an-
nounced in the new directives and offers
some suggestions for implementation.
The Right to Counsel
A 1932 case, Powell v. Alabama,' stat-
ed the origin of court-appointed counsel
in this way:
Originally, in England, a person
charged with treason or felony was de-
nied the aid of counsel, except in re-
spect of legal questions. . . . At the
same time parties in civil cases and
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persons accused of misdemeanors
were entitled to the full assistance of
counsel.
The English rule of only partial right to
legal counsel came under fire in virtually
all the American colonieS2 and eventual-
ly was nullified by the Sixth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution. By 1836,
England, too, recognized the right to
counsel in all criminal cases. 3
However, until relatively recent times,
the right to counsel benefited only
those who could afford to hire their own
attorneys. In 1938, the U.S. Supreme
Court established the right of indigent
criminal defendants in federal cases to
have the assistance of counsel appointed
at state expense.4 In 1963, Gideon v.
Wainwright5 extended the right to court-
appointed counsel to defendants in state
courts.
Developments in Colorado
While some state courts and legisla-
tures had established a right to counsel
before Gideon, Colorado was not among
them. In the 1949 case of Kelley v. Peo-
ple,6 the Colorado Supreme Court held
that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel did not apply to state prosecu-
tions. However, after Gideon, the court
amended the Colorado Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure ("Crim.P.") Rule 44 so
that, by the end of 1963, Colorado trial
courts were required to appoint counsel
to represent indigent criminal defen-
dants in felony cases and could appoint
counsel in misdemeanor cases.
In a 1965 case, Allen v. People,' the
court recognized that Gideon had changed
the rules. The Allen decision noted that
the holding in Kelley had been nullified
by the amended Crim.P. Rule 44. It also
stated that "the right of a person ac-
cused of a crime to be represented by an
attorney can no longer be challenged."8
It is now clearly recognized that the
Sixth Amendment and Article II, § 16 of
the Colorado Constitution provide that
criminal defendants have the right to
counsel regardless of their ability to pay.9
The requirement that all criminal de-
fendants receive the benefit of counsel
originally was fulfilled in Colorado by
the appointment of private attorneys. As
the demand for appointed counsel grew,
some of the larger counties set up their
own public defender offices. Finally, in
1970, the Colorado General Assembly es-
tablished the Office of Public Defender.
That Office now has twenty branches
around the state, as well as an appellate
division in Denver. The Office of Public
Defender presently employs approxi-
mately 150 attorneys and 100 support
staff throughout Colorado.
The Current Situation
Despite the existence of the Office of
Public Defender, there remains a need
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for court-appointed attorneys any time
the Public Defender has a conflict of in-
terest in a specific case. Conflicts arise
most frequently when two or more peo-
ple are charged in connection with one
criminal episode. The Public Defender
generally can represent only one of the
individuals and asks the court to appoint
counsel for the remaining defendants.
Other conflicts arise when the Public
Defender represents a witness or a vic-
tim in a case and is precluded from rep-
resenting the individual charged. The
monies appropriated to pay court-ap-
pointed counsel currently are adminis-
tered by the Public Defender.
In most of Colorado's more populated
counties it is not difficult to find attor-
neys with experience in criminal law
who are willing to accept such appoint-
ments. Some of these counties, such as
Boulder and Pueblo, have successful sys-
tems for determining which private at-
torneys are willing and able to accept
appointments. They require interested
lawyers to register with the court ad-
ministrator and to inform the court of
their experience.
In other counties, the appointment
system is not as formal. Judges or clerks
maintain lists of attorneys who will ac-
cept appointments, then appoint these
attorneys more or less at random. For
example, Denver does not have a formal
system, but currently is reviewing its in-
formal system to ensure that it is being
administered equitably and efficiently.
In less populated counties where there
are far fewer attorneys, sometimes there
is a problem finding attorneys who are
willing and able to accept court appoint-
ments in criminal cases. This problem
was highlighted in a recent Colorado
Supreme Court holding 0 and was ad-
dressed in the Chief Justice's new direc-
tives.
Recently, a problem also has arisen in
connection with providing appellate
counsel in criminal cases. The Appellate
Division of the Office of Public Defender
has announced that it will no longer ac-
cept court appointments to handle the
appeals of criminal defendants who had
retained counsel at trial but who cannot
afford to do so for appeal. According to
the Office of Public Defender, its existing
appellate caseload is so large that it can-
not meet the requirement from the ap-
pellate courts that appeals be handled in
a timely fashion.
The impact of this decision will be felt
by (1) trial judges, who now will need to
appoint appellate counsel and (2) attor-
neys accepting trial-level court appoint-
ments, who also may find themselves be-
ing appointed to handle appeals. It re-
mains to be seen how difficult it will be
to fill this need, but the outlook is not
promising. The Public Defender has
money available to pay private attorneys
to handle criminal appeals, but is unable
to find enough attorneys to fill the exist-
ing need.
"Payment for travel time
might make those who do
accept court-appointed cases
more willing to travel
to less populated areas."
The Effect of Stern
A recent Colorado Supreme Court
case, Stern v. Grand County Court,"
may have been the catalyst for the Chief
Justice's new directives. Stern, an attor-
ney in Montrose, had been licensed for
twelve years in Colorado when he was
appointed to a criminal case by the
county court in Grand County. The de-
fendant in the case was charged with
second degree assault-a class four
felony-and two misdemeanors. Stern
moved to withdraw from the case, as-
serting that he was not competent to
represent the defendant and that Code
of Professional Responsibility DR6-
101(A) prevented him from doing so. Ac-
cording to Stern, eleven years had passed
since he had voluntarily represented a
criminal defendant and, in that time, he
had not read cases, rules or other mate-
rials concerning criminal law or proce-
dure. He also asserted that his represen-
tation of the defendant would constitute
malpractice and would deny the defen-
dant the effective assistance of counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.12
The court denied Stern's motion to
withdraw, with the Colorado Supreme
Court affirming. Stern's argument of in-
competency was rejected by the Su-
preme Court for two reasons. First, the
court found that Stern had not met the
burden of proving his own incompe-
tency. A mere assertion was deemed in-
sufficient. Second, the court noted that,
even if Stern had met this burden, the
trial court had found that he was capa-
ble of becoming competent. Thus, the tri-
al court's denial of Stern's motion to
withdraw was not an abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court rejected as pre-
mature Stern's claim that he could not
render effective assistance of counsel.
The test for effective assistance asks two
questions: (1) whether counsel's perform-
ance was substandard and (2) whether
the defendant was prejudiced by the per-
formance.13 Stern had not yet done any-
thing in the case; it was, therefore, too
early to determine whether his represen-
tation would be substandard. For the
same reason, it was premature to deter-
mine whether the defendant had suf-
fered any harm. 4
Inconsistent Guidelines
The court in Stern discussed a num-
ber of principles relevant to the appoint-
ment of counsel. Noting that the power
of a trial court to appoint counsel is no
longer open to question, the court said
that attorneys, as officers of the court,
are bound to accept such appointments."
Quoting at length from the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility ("Code") and the
American Bar Association Standards for
Criminal Justice ("Standards"), the court
placed the duty of providing legal repre-
sentation for indigent criminal defen-
dants squarely on the bar.
Both the Code and the Standards give
mixed signals in their treatment of the
duty of counsel to accept court appoint-
ments. The Code suggests that every
lawyer has a duty to provide legal serv-
ices to the disadvantaged.16 At the same
time, the Code prohibits lawyers from
handling cases which they know, or
should know, they are not competent to
handle except in association with compe-
tent counsel." Thus, while attorneys
should accept pro bono cases and court
appointments, they should not accept
cases they are not competent to handle.
The Standards contain similarly in-
consistent guidelines. They suggest that
"the responsibility for providing legal
representation is shared by the bar with
society as a whole."' 8 However, the Stan-
dards then note that, because of the in-
creasingly specialized nature of criminal
law, even experienced attorneys should
not be appointed in criminal cases un-
less they have "[flamiliarity with the
practice and procedure of the criminal
courts and knowledge in the art of crim-
inal defense." 9
The Standards attempt to address the
problem of the competency of lawyers re-
ceiving court appointments:
Where interested attorneys lack suffi-
cient experience and skill in criminal
defense, there are a variety of proce-
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dures that can help them qualify for
assigned cases.20
Specific procedures mentioned are (1)
continuing legal education ("CLE") pro-
grams and (2) the assignment of inexpe-
rienced lawyers as associate counsel to
more experienced lawyers.21 While these
procedures appear excellent in theory,
they may be hard for attorneys to imple-
ment. First, CLE programs, no matter
how good, do not substitute for actual
experience. Second, it is extremely diffi-
cult not only to find an experienced at-
torney to act as a mentor and to find the
time to associate with that mentor, but
also to make a living while doing so.
These shortcomings are most obvious
precisely where the problem is greatest:
Colorado's rural areas have less access to
CLE programs, fewer attorneys who
qualify as mentors and fewer opportu-
nities for inexperienced attorneys to
learn.
Findings of the CBA Task Force
In 1987, the CBA Court-Appointed
Counsel Task Force ("Task Force") was
created. The Task Force issued a report
in December 19882 based on an exami-
nation of court appointments in all types
of cases: mental health, domestic rela-
tions and juvenile matters, as well as
criminal cases. The Task Force noted
three major issues in providing counsel
to indigent persons: (1) the compensa-
tion of those who accept appointments,
(2) the fairness of the appointment sys-
tem to the members of the bar and (3)
the competency of those who are ap-
pointed. Directive 89-2 (discussed below)
deals with the compensation issue. How-
ever, the issues of fairness and compe-
tency remain difficult to resolve.
Regarding fairness to the attorneys
who accept appointments, the Task
Force found that attorneys outside the
metro area sometimes felt forced to ac-
cept appointments and were asked to ac-
cept more appointments than their
metro area counterparts. Additionally,
the Task Force found that there was a
large segment of the bar that was not
bearing any of the burden of court ap-
pointments.
The Task Force also found that ensur-
ing the competency of court-appointed
counsel was a major issue. Its report
noted that court appointments in crimi-
nal cases affect not only an attorney's
ability to meet his or her responsibili-
ties to the client and the profession un-
der the Code, but also the availability
and price of malpractice insurance.
CRIMINAL LAW NEWSLETTER
Directives 89-2 and 89-3
Directive 89-2 deals with the hourly
rates which court-appointed attorneys
can charge the state. Between January
1, 1990, and January 1, 1991, those fees
will be raised incrementally to $50 per
hour for in-court time and $40 per hour
for out-of-court time. Directive 89-2 also
raises the maximum fee which can be
paid in the various types of criminal cas-
es.
The increase is a welcome and over-
due action in light of the fact that the
fees were last raised in 1977 and had be-
come inadequate to cover even the over-
head of many attorneys. However, the
Chief Justice does not have the power ei-
ther to raise or appropriate money. If the
state legislature does not appropriate ad-
equate funds to cover this increase, it
may turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory.
This increased pay may attract some
attorneys who previously avoided court
appointments because of the low fees. If
this proves to be true, the problem of
finding qualified attorneys to accept ap-
pointments will be somewhat ameliorat-
ed. However, in this author's opinion,
most attorneys who accept such appoint-
ments are motivated by a commitment
to the constitutional right to counsel and
the enjoyment of trial work. Therefore, it
is unlikely that the fee increase will at-
tract a significant number of qualified,
but previously recalcitrant, attorneys.
The second measure, Directive 89-3,
changes the manner in which attorneys
are selected for appointment in criminal
cases. The thrust of this change is in
Section V of the Directive, which says
that the
name of any attorney who practices in
the judicial district, or who appears
periodically in its courts, including
non-resident attorneys, shall be main-
tained on a list from which a judge
will make appointments.
Directive 89-3 meets the goal of ensur-
ing that all attorneys-or at least attor-
neys who go to court-share in the bur-
den of court appointments in criminal
cases. However, it does not address the
need to ensure that appointed attorneys
are competent to handle criminal cases.
Directive 89-3 may even exacerbate that
problem because it broadens the pool of
appointees to include many attorneys
who have never handled a criminal case.
Possible Solutions
The Task Force recommended the cre-
ation of a centralized Office of Appointed
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Counsel to administer the funds appro-
priated for court-appointed counsel, set
standards for court appointees and as-
sist judges in finding qualified counsel to
accept appointments in their districts.
The proposed office would have respon-
sibility for ensuring the availability of at-
torneys in criminal, as well as guardian
ad litem, mental health, delinquency, de-
pendency and neglect and all other types
of cases where court appointments are
necessary. The CBA Criminal Law Sec-
tion unanimously endorsed this proposal
at its January meeting.
Other suggestions were considered,
such as a proposal to establish a state-
funded, statewide conflicts branch of the
Office of Public Defender. Such a branch
would accept primary responsibility for
providing representation to indigent de-
fendants who cannot currently be repre-
sented by the Public Defender. However,
this proposal was rejected by the Task
Force because of "the desire of the crimi-
nal bar to continue to have the opportu-
nity to represent criminal defendants."a
As mentioned in the Task Force report,
most lawyers who accept appointments
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there is a limited number of criminal de-
fendants with the financial ability to
hire counsel, these lawyers see court ap-
pointments as the best opportunity to
continue to practice criminal defense. In
addition, as a practical matter, it is un-
likely that a conflicts office would solve
the problem in rural areas where the
current problem is most acute.
Another change that might ease the
shortage of competent court appointees
is to make it explicit that the travel time
of appointed counsel will be compensat-
ed. Payment for travel time might make
those who do accept court-appointed
cases more willing to travel to less popu-
lated areas.
The CBA recently developed the
"Lend-a-Lawyer" program at the urging
of CBA President Chris Brauchli. The
program, in which metropolitan firms
"loan" associates (with pay) to rural ar-
eas to accept pro bono and court-appoint-
ed cases, was highlighted in a recent bar
journal article.24 At this writing, a Den-
ver firm has "loaned" one of its employ-
ees, and two retired attorneys have
agreed to participate in the program.
Conclusion
American society has accepted a mor-
al and constitutional obligation to ensure
that every person who is entitled to
counsel receives effective representation
regardless of ability to pay. Under the
law, lawyers bear the primary responsi-
bility for meeting this obligation. While
individual attorneys should be given dis-
cretion in determining how they fulfill
their obligation, court appointments are
one of the most important and visible
ways in which the obligation is met. The
legal community must ensure that legal
services are efficiently delivered, that
they are available everywhere in the
state and that the burden of providing
these services is shared equitably.
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